

**COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO
THE DIAPHRAGM WALL AND PLATFORM SLAB
CONSTRUCTION WORKS
AT THE HUNG HOM STATION EXTENSION
UNDER THE SHATIN TO CENTRAL LINK PROJECT**

(APPOINTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 2 OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ORDINANCE (CHAPTER 86) ON 10 JULY 2018)

WITNESS STATEMENT OF

**MR CHAN, FAN, JP
SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT AND HOUSING**

I. Introduction

I, CHAN, Fan, Secretary for Transport and Housing of 22nd Floor, East Wing, Central Government Offices, 2 Tim Mei Avenue, Tamar, Hong Kong, do say as follows:-

1. I am the Secretary for Transport and Housing (“**STH**”) and have held this position since 1 July 2017. My main duties include the following:

- (a) to set out policy objectives and goals; develop, formulate and shape policies on land and waterborne transport, air services, port and maritime services, logistics development, and housing;
- (b) to assist the Chief Executive in policy making as a member of the Executive Council;
- (c) to secure the support of the community and the Legislative Council (“**LegCo**”) for policies and initiatives within the Bureau’s purview; and
- (d) to exercise relevant statutory functions and oversee the delivery of services by the executive departments under the purview of the Transport and Housing Bureau (“**THB**”).

2. I make this witness statement pursuant to the requests of the Commission of Inquiry (“**Commission**”) into the Diaphragm Wall and Platform Slab Construction Works at the Hung Hom Station Extension under the Shatin to Central Link Project (“**SCL Project**”), set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo dated 1 August 2018 (“**the Letter of 1 August**”) to me and the Director of Highways (“**DHy**”). Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

3. Following the general division of work between a policy bureau and its operational departments, my witness statement will address questions 1, 3, 7, 10(c), 11(b), 11(c), 12, 14, 16 to 18 (“**Questions**”) at pages 5 to 18 of the Letter of 1 August that are within my (or my Bureau’s) policy purview. Questions that are operational and technical in nature and fall within the scope of work of my operational department (i.e. the Highways Department (“**HyD**”) under DHy) will be addressed by DHy and/or other relevant officers of HyD. In summary, this witness statement will mainly address the following questions (in whole or in part) raised in the Letter of 1 August:

- (a) Part III below addresses THB’s overall responsibilities and role in the SCL Project, in answer to Questions 1 and 3.
- (b) Part IV below sets out my response to Question 7 on the suspected Defective Steel Works.
- (c) Part V below consists of the Government’s responses and actions taken on the Hung Hom Station Extension incident since the media reports in late May 2018 and responds to other matters raised in the Letter of 1 August, in answer to Questions 7, 10(c), 11(b), 11(c), 12, 14, 16 to 18.

II. Background of the SCL Project

4. Before turning to the Questions, I will first provide some background information on the SCL Project, which would hopefully facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand. A brief description of the background of the SCL Project covering the project scope, funding, programme and the concession approach is at **CF-1** for reference.

III. Institutional Arrangements for the Implementation of the SCL Project

5. The ensuing paragraphs provide an overview of the division of work between THB and HyD, and the role of THB's subject team in implementing the SCL Project. I shall defer to DHy and/or his relevant officer(s) to elaborate in their statements on HyD's roles and the monitoring and verification of the SCL Project.

(A) THB's Overall Responsibilities and Role in Implementing the SCL Project

THB's Overall Responsibilities

6. Upon the re-organisation of the Government Secretariat in July 2007, the transport portfolio of the then Environment, Transport and Works Bureau was transferred to the Transport Branch of THB. It covers matters relating to Hong Kong's internal and external transportation, including air services, land transport, maritime transport and logistics. In this respect, THB formulates policies on the development of transport infrastructure, the provision of transport services, the management of traffic, and the support of environmental improvement measures in transport-related areas. It also devises and implements policies on all aspects of civil aviation, maritime and port development, and logistics development. Among other policy objectives, THB is responsible for the policy relating to the planning and implementation of Hong Kong's railway infrastructure.¹

THB's Role in the SCL Project

7. THB is responsible for the general oversight on the planning and implementation of all cross-boundary and domestic railway projects including SCL. In the context of the SCL project, THB was involved in

¹ I am a Non-Executive Director of MTRCL (appointed by the Chief Executive pursuant to section 8 of the Mass Transit Railway Ordinance (Cap. 556)) with the Permanent Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport), the Under Secretary for Transport and Housing, the Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 1 and the Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 2 as my Alternate Directors (pursuant to Article 98 of the Articles of Association of MTRCL).

the following key administrative and policy procedures in the planning and initial implementation stages:

- (a) THB presented to the Chief Executive in Council in March 2008 the proposed way forward for the SCL Project, and sought the Chief Executive in Council's approval to, among others, ask MTR Corporation Limited ("MTRCL") to proceed with the further planning and design of SCL, and further discuss with MTRCL on the implementation details of the SCL scheme based on the concession approach² to fund the project;
- (b) THB sought funding approval from LegCo at various stages of the project implementation. The approved project estimate for the entire SCL Project amounts to \$80.66 billion as at July 2018:
 - (i) for SCL's protection works³, LegCo Finance Committee ("FC") approved funding of \$0.15 billion in July 2010 and \$0.54 billion in June 2011;
 - (ii) for SCL's advance works⁴, LegCo FC approved funding of \$7.70 billion in February 2011 and \$0.85 billion in June 2017; and

² Before the rail merger in December 2007, all railway projects were implemented under the ownership approach, under which the two railway corporations (i.e. MTRCL and Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation) were responsible for the funding, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the railway, and ultimately own the railway. Funding support will be required from the Government if the project is not financially viable. It was agreed in the context of the rail merger that for individual new railway projects which are not natural extensions of the MTRCL's railway, the Government has the discretion to determine whether to adopt the ownership approach or the concession approach. Under the concession approach, the Government provides funding for the capital cost and owns the railways upon its completion. An operator is selected to operate the new railway through a service concession to be granted by the Government or a third party in or to which the Government has vested or leased the new railway.

³ SCL's protection works consist of protection works at the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter (including the construction of a concrete tunnel box, construction of a temporary seawall and its subsequent removal, dredging works at the typhoon shelter and construction of a temporary jetty) and protection works at Wan Chai north (including the construction of two rows of diaphragm walls and a concrete slab to support the water mains under which SCL works would take place).

⁴ SCL's advance works consist of advance railway works (including the expansion of Admiralty Station to accommodate SCL railway facilities and construction of the portion of Ho Man Tin Station for SCL) and advance non-railway works (including the reprovisioning of the International Mail Centre at Hung Hom and part of the reprovisioning works at Harcourt Garden and Hong Kong Park).

(iii) for SCL's main works, LegCo FC approved in May 2012 the funding of \$71.42 billion.

- (c) THB arranged the gazettal of the railway scheme of SCL under the Railways Ordinance (Cap. 519) on 26 November 2010, handled the objections to the scheme, and then arranged gazettal of the amendments to the railway scheme on 15 July 2011 and 11 November 2011 to address concerns expressed by the public during the consultation period and to incorporate design changes. Subsequently, 12 hearing sessions by independent panels (comprising non-official members) were conducted from December 2011 to February 2012 to deal with the unwithdrawn objections; and
- (d) eventually, THB secured the Chief Executive in Council's authorisation of the SCL scheme on 27 March 2012.

8. THB also provides advice and input to HyD, from the policy angle, on implementation issues and matters which may attract public or media attention.

9. THB reports to the Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways ("RSC") of the LegCo Panel on Transport on the progress of the SCL Project, major issues about the planning and implementation of new railway projects, and the operation of existing railway lines. Since June 2014, THB/HyD have provided RSC with quarterly progress reports of the SCL Project, including issues such as the preservation of archaeological findings discovered in Sung Wong Toi Station (formerly named as To Kwa Wan Station), interfacing problems involving the SCL project and other projects such as Central-Wanchai Reclamation, the discovery of wartime unexploded ordnance during the excavation under the SCL Project, etc.

10. The organisation chart of the Transport Branch of THB is at CF-2 for reference. The subject team for the implementation of domestic railway projects, including the SCL Project, is led by the Principal

Assistant Secretary (Transport) 7 (“**PAS(T)7**”) under the supervision of the Deputy Secretary (Transport) 1 (“**DS(T)1**”) who reports to the Permanent Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) (“**PS(T)**”).

11. Officers in the Transport Branch of THB are responsible for providing policy inputs relating to the planning and implementation of the relevant projects. Given the established division of work between THB and its departments, the subject team for the SCL Project (i.e. Team 7) keeps a general oversight in monitoring the rail project implementation. The monitoring of the railway construction and liaison with the project manager (i.e. MTRCL) are the main responsibilities of the Railway Development Office (“**RDO**”) of HyD.

(B) HyD’s Role in the SCL Project

12. Under the Public Finance Ordinance (Cap. 2), the Controlling Officer for the SCL Project is DHy who shall be responsible and accountable for the expenditure for the SCL Project. According to the Controlling Officer’s Report for HyD in the 2017-18 Estimates, the SCL is one of the new railway projects under the Railway Development Programme (which contributes to Policy Area 21: Land and Waterborne Transport under STH). The aim of this Programme is to implement the Railway Development Strategy and formulate plans for further development of the railway network.

13. According to the said Controlling Officer’s Report, HyD plans, monitors and co-ordinates various activities associated with the implementation of new railway projects. HyD liaises with MTRCL to develop detailed schemes for the railways, undertakes necessary route protection, preparatory work and statutory procedures, and resolves interface issues arising from the implementation of these projects. HyD also co-ordinates with other departments concerned for the approval of infrastructure layout design for various new railways and their interface arrangements with other projects. In this respect, HyD also takes part in site liaison for traffic diversion, site handover arrangements, as well as issues relating to the commissioning and operation of the railways.

14. I shall defer to DHy to explain the roles of HyD in the implementation of the SCL Project in his statement to the Commission.

(C) EAs between the Government and MTRCL

15. THB (for and on behalf of the Government) entered into an EA with MTRCL on 24 November 2008 for the design and site investigation of the SCL (i.e. EA1). On 17 May 2011 and 29 May 2012, THB (for and on behalf of the Government) and MTRCL signed another two EAs, i.e. EA2 for advance works relating to the SCL and EA3 for the construction and commissioning of the SCL respectively.

16. Pursuant to the EAs, MTRCL should carry out the entrustment activities that relate to the provision of project management services with the skill and care reasonably to be expected of a professional and competent project manager. The role of the project manager includes the procurement, coordination, administration, management and supervision (including testing and examining the plant, goods, material and workmanship) of the design and construction of works, and the procurement of goods that are analogous to those being procured under the Third Party Contracts⁵ and associated contract management, and the enforcement of claims (ref. Clause 5.1 of EA2 and EA3).

17. As RDO of HyD is the representative of THB in the execution of the EAs for the implementation of the SCL Project (ref. Clause 24.1 of EA1, Clause 25.1 of EA2 and Clause 30.1 of EA3), I shall defer to DHy and/or his relevant officer(s) to elaborate on the EAs (in particular, their implementation) in their statements and to provide, as appropriate, the relevant provisions in the EAs and any relevant documents relating to the construction of the SCL Project.

⁵ Third Party Contracts refer to contracts between MTRCL and any contractor, consultant, adviser or other third party employed or otherwise engaged by MTRCL in connection with the entrustment activities as defined in the EAs.

(D) Monitoring System for the SCL Project at the Bureau level

18. By way of further background, I should mention that HyD has adopted for the SCL Project a “check the checker” approach, which was recommended in 2008 by Lloyd’s Register Rail (Asia) Limited (“**Lloyd’s**”) for the Express Rail Link (“**XRL**”) Project. The approach is premised on the fact that MTRCL’s processes were known to be robust and in line with industry best practice, and that they were regularly reviewed and audited by outside bodies and had been proven and refined through the delivery of many high quality railway projects in Hong Kong and abroad (ref. paragraphs 1.1.5 and 6.6.1 of Lloyd’s Report, see extracts at **CF-3**).

19. Under the “check the checker” approach, HyD, with the support of an external Monitoring and Verification (“**M&V**”) Consultant monitors and verifies that MTRCL complies with its obligations in the EAs. I understand that HyD’s monitoring system for the SCL Project involves four main elements: (1) the Project Supervision Committee (“**PSC**”), (2) the Project Coordination Meetings, (3) the Project Progress Meetings and (4) engagement of the M&V Consultant. I shall defer to DHy and/or his officer(s) to elaborate on details of these elements. I shall also defer to DS(T)1 to describe in her statement the monitoring arrangements at the Bureau level, including the regular Heads of Departments meetings at which DHy and his senior directorate officers would report to me, among other things, the progress of the SCL Project and, where necessary, significant issues relating to the implementation of the SCL Project.

IV. The Suspected “Defective Steel Works” at the Hung Hom Station Extension

20. According to my understanding, prior to the media enquiry on 29 May 2018, THB had not received information regarding the suspected “Defective Steel Works” at the Hung Hom Station Extension. Personally, I first heard about the aforementioned incident from media reports on 30 May 2018.

V. Government's Responses to the Incident Relating to Hung Hom Station Extension

(A) Actions Taken by THB after Media Reports about the Incident related to Hung Hom Station Extension

21. On 30 May 2018, there was extensive media coverage on the suspected irregularities concerning the SCL Project. The media reported the suspected unauthorised cutting of reinforcement steel bars and faulty fixing of those shortened reinforcement steel bars to the steel couplers. The Government and the public were concerned that these irregularities would have serious safety implications on the structure of the rail station platforms. THB and HyD were engaged in intensive discussions on the incident.

22. At the regular PSC meeting held on 30 May 2018, DHy expressed grave concern on media reports regarding the non-compliant reinforcement fixing works, and demanded MTRCL to report on what had actually happened and to provide solid evidence as to whether any irregularities of reinforcement fixing works had been fully rectified to the required standards. From THB, PAS(T)7 and the then Assistant Secretary (Transport) 7B attended the meeting. To avoid duplication of documents, the extracts of the relevant meeting minutes will be produced by Mr Leung Man Ho of HyD in his statement to the Commission.

23. By letter dated 31 May 2018 (see **CF-4**), HyD requested MTRCL to submit an incident report which, among other things, should address:

- (a) if any irregularities at the steel bar fixing works had been rectified before concreting and that the works were up to the required standard; and
- (b) the regulatory actions against the contractor and its subcontractors.

24. In response to the news reports on 30 May 2018, MTRCL indicated, through its press release on the same day, that rectification works related to the workmanship deficiencies in the steel works between the diaphragm wall and the slab structure of the two platform levels have been completed in compliance with the specifications and requirements in relevant drawings. The staff of HyD and its M&V Consultant carried out an on-site inspection at the Hung Hom Station on 30 May 2018, including inspecting the condition of the construction works and checking the inspection records of MTRCL. No serious crack or water leakage in the concrete structures was observed during the site inspection on that day. On 31 May 2018, I had a discussion with PS(T), DHy and DS(T)¹ about the incident. We agreed that MTRCL should be asked to arrange an independent third-party expert for carrying out a load test to ascertain whether the structures could sustain the design loads. Subsequently, HyD wrote to MTRCL on the same day. A copy of HyD's letter to MTRCL is at **CF-5**.

25. On 9 June 2018, THB published a press release ("**the Press Release of 9 June**") (copy at **CF-6**) in relation to the email correspondence between THB and the China Technology Corporation Limited ("**CT**"). As mentioned in the Press Release of 9 June, CT sent an email to the general email account of my office on 15 September 2017 (Friday), requesting for a meeting to discuss construction issue of the SCL Project. Following established practice, the relevant officer at my office referred the email to the subject team which has policy responsibility for the SCL Project (i.e. Team 7), and the team then passed the case to HyD for follow-up given that the issue was, according to CT, technical in nature. On 18 September 2017 (Monday), CT sent another email to THB indicating that the suspected issue of concern had all been clarified and that no further action was required. I was not aware of CT's emails to my office until the incident was reported in a news article by the South China Morning Post on 5 June 2018. Nor was I aware of the communication between THB and CT, between HyD and CT, and between THB and HyD in September 2017. On 5 June 2018, I received through my Press Secretary THB's draft response in relation to the news report, which included THB

and HyD officers' communications with CT in September 2017. I was subsequently shown the relevant email records.

26. Since 6 June 2018, THB facilitated HyD's follow-up actions by providing input to and clearing the press releases issued respectively on 6 and 15 June 2018 in response to the latest development of the incident, as well as demanding (through HyD's letter of 12 June 2018) MTRCL's timely submission of the incident report. During this period, under THB's steering, HyD issued six other letters to MTRCL on 6, 11, 13, 15, 19 and 20 June 2018 respectively demanding MTRCL to provide details of the load test, notifying MTRCL of HyD's referral of information provided by MTRCL to the Police for investigation, and demanding MTRCL to improve its communication system, etc. Copies of the press releases and letters issued by HyD between 6 and 20 June 2018 are at **CF-7**.

27. On 15 June 2018, MTRCL provided an incident report ("**Incident Report**") to HyD regarding the quality of slab construction at Hung Hom Station Extension, and made the report public at the same time. In its report and related documents, MTRCL pointed out the inconsistencies among the representations given by the relevant parties, namely the main contractor, Leighton Contractors (Asia) Ltd, and two of its sub-contractors, Fang Sheung Construction Company and China Technology Corporation Limited. MTRCL did not offer any views on these representations. On the basis of the information separately provided by MTRCL (a copy of the MTRCL's letter on 15 June 2018 (with an enclosure which had not been disclosed to the public) is at **CF-8**), HyD suspected that the case might have criminal implications and after consulting THB, decided to refer the case to the Police for investigation on 15 June 2018.

28. HyD is of the view that the incident at Hung Hom Station Extension of the SCL Project suggests deficiencies in MTRCL's existing monitoring, control and communication mechanisms. In particular, I note that:

- (a) site issues with potential impact on the quality of works and public safety were not reported at all or in a timely manner to the senior management of MTRCL for monitoring and follow up actions; and
- (b) MTRCL had not informed the Government of these incidents until they were disclosed by the media.

29. The aforementioned deficiencies in MTRCL's site supervision and reporting mechanism, prompted HyD, after discussing with THB, to send letters (on 22 and 26 June 2018 respectively) to the senior management of MTRCL. These letters requested MTRCL to critically review and provide concrete improvement measures for its site supervision system and communication system, and to provide a response to HyD within two weeks from 22 June 2018. MTRCL was also asked to report on the relevant statistical data and the performance trend of quality of the works.

30. On 6 July 2018, MTRCL submitted to HyD the key findings from its initial review of the site supervision and communication systems with a list of improvement measures. These include the enhancement of the register of non-conformance reports and developing guidelines for reporting issues from inspector level to senior management within MTRCL. Copies of HyD's letters on 22 and 26 June and MTRCL's submission on 6 July 2018 are at **CF-9**.

31. In the course of HyD's follow-up actions under THB's steering, MTRCL provided to HyD by letter dated 13 July 2018, among other things, three attachments showing the structural connection details of the west side (Attachment A of the letter) and east side (Attachments B and C) of the platform slab for the East West Corridor with the diaphragm walls. A copy of MTRCL's letter to HyD on 13 July 2018 (which was copied to THB) is at **CF-10**. After careful examination by HyD and the Buildings Department ("**BD**"), it was found that the connection details shown in the said letter deviated from the alleged as-built records and revealed the following serious problems:

- (a) the typical connection details in MTRCL's letter dated 13 July 2018 were inconsistent with that shown in the Incident Report and the design previously agreed by BD;
- (b) according to the revised connection details in MTRCL's letter of 13 July 2018, the total number of couplers used would be significantly less than the 23,500 couplers as stated in MTRCL's Incident Report⁶; and
- (c) MTRCL presented signed inspection forms for 23,500 couplers to HyD, BD and the M&V Consultant for inspection in end June 2018. If the revised connection details submitted on 13 July 2018 are correct, then the Government would have valid reasons to cast doubts on the validity of the relevant inspection forms.

32. HyD reported the aforesaid findings to PAS(T)⁷ on 26 July 2018. DS(T)¹ and DHy brought the problems to the attention of PS(T) on 27 July 2018. I was alerted to the problems by PS(T) on the same day. On PS(T)'s instruction, HyD issued a letter to MTRCL on 27 July 2018 pointing out the discrepancy between site records and design details, and that MTRCL had not informed BD of the design changes which deviated from the as-built records. HyD repeatedly requested MTRCL to provide further information to address the above queries. MTRCL has yet to explain the identified discrepancies. A copy of the said letter is at **CF-11**.

33. The Chief Executive chaired an emergency meeting on 5 August 2018 to discuss the matter. THB was represented by myself, PS(T) and the Deputy Secretary (Transport) 2. The Government subsequently asked the MTRCL's Board to treat the issue seriously and conduct a thorough investigation into the incident. The Government also requested MTRCL to relieve the responsible project management personnel of their duties with immediate effect and to continue to pursue the personnel concerned.

⁶ I understand that MTRCL subsequently informed HyD in a meeting on 1 August 2018 that there would be a reduction of about 2,000 couplers arising from the design change.

On 7 August 2018, I held a press conference with PS(T), the Permanent Secretary for Development (Works), DHy and the Director of Buildings to inform the public, among other things, of the above matter. The transcript of my opening remarks at the press conference is at **CF-12**.

34. On 27 and 28 June and 11 and 12 July 2018, THB attended LegCo meetings which debated motions moved by LegCo Members for the setting up of a select committee to inquire into the incident at Hung Hom Station Extension and the request for information on the incident from MTRCL under the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance (Cap. 382). THB also attended the RSC meeting on 1 June 2018, the special RSC meeting on 13 July 2018 and the LegCo Panel on Transport special meeting on 31 August 2018 to respond to queries about the progress of the SCL Project and issues about the suspected defective steelworks at the platform slabs.

35. In the paper submitted by THB and HyD to the LegCo Panel on Transport for the meeting on 31 August 2018, it was stated (among other things) that, subject to the opinions of the expert appointed by BD and the Expert Adviser Team (referred to below), and also further information to be provided by MTRCL, the Government would not rule out the option of opening up part of the connection between the platform slab and diaphragm walls for examination. It is important and prudent to collect and analyse all further materials and expert opinions before any conclusive view is formed in this regard and the Government will keep an open mind on what should be the most appropriate test or inspection method(s) with a view to ensuring public safety. A copy of the said paper to LegCo Panel on Transport is at **CF-13**.

(B) Enhancing Future Management of the SCL Project

(i) HyD Task Group

36. THB is very concerned about the suspected irregularities at the Hung Hom Station Extension under the SCL Project, and has requested DHy to take immediate remedial measures. A Task Group led by DHy

was established on 19 June 2018 to review the Government's monitoring and control mechanism for the SCL Project and to make recommendations arising from the recent incidents relating to the SCL Project. DHy and/or his relevant officer(s) will provide more details about the Task Group in their statements to the Commission.

(ii) Expert Adviser Team for the SCL Project

37. In addition to the Task Group, THB established an Expert Adviser Team for the SCL Project on 15 August 2018 to conduct an overall review of MTRCL's project management system and recommend additional management and monitoring measures to be undertaken by MTRCL and government departments as appropriate in taking forward the SCL Project. The Expert Adviser Team consists of three senior retired government officers, namely Dr Lau Ching-kwong (former Director of Civil Engineering), Mr Hui Siu-wai (former Director of Buildings), and Mr Wong Hok-ning (former Head of the Geotechnical Engineering Office). The membership and terms of reference of the Expert Adviser Team is at **CF-14**.

38. The Expert Adviser Team will advise on, *inter alia*, the most pragmatic methodology for MTRCL to ascertain the structural safety and the as-built condition of the diaphragm wall and platform slab construction works of Hung Hom Station Extension, consider any further investigations necessary in relation to the construction of key structures in all stations of the SCL Project, and advise on any other matters relevant to the works of the SCL Project. The Team will complete a report with their findings in about nine months' time, and may produce interim report(s) as necessary. Professional staff from relevant government departments have been deployed to provide technical support to the Team.

39. As the factual cause and extent of the incident are the subject matters of ongoing investigation, THB is not presently in a position to conclude whether and, if so, how the incident could have been avoided by any particular measure(s). THB welcomes the setting up of the

Commission and will use its best endeavours to assist in the Commission's work and follow up on any recommendation(s) the Commission may make.

40. I confirm that the contents of this witness statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 7th day of September 2018



CHAN, Fan

Secretary for Transport and Housing